Among the various limitations put by the IMF on the free use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) is the reconstitution requirement which binds participants in the Special Drawing Account to maintain a stipulated average level of allocated SDRs. Using the example of Zambia which is representative for many developing countries, this article displays the adverse effects which arise from the present reconstitution rules and proposes a possible modification.
T he debate on the International Monetary System in the 1960's led to the conviction that sooner or later it would be necessary to have the means to augment the liquidity that would be unconditionally and automatically available to members of the International Monetary Fund. The outcome of these discussions was the creation of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as a new reserve asset to supplement gold and foreign exchange. Yet, when the scheme became operational on July 28, 1989 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put various limitations on the free use of the new reserve asset. One such restriction relates to the reconstitution requirement which binds participants in the Special Drawing Account, to maintain a stipulated average level of allocated SDRs.
The reconstitution provisions incorporated in the Special Drawing Account were intended to discourage:
[] the prolongation of balance of payments deficits which allocation of SDRs might otherwise permit, [] the use of SDRs for longer-term financing, and [] the disproportionate use by participants of SDRs because of a preference for the retention of other reserve assets 1.
Although it is generally conceded that it is of "the essence of monetary reserves that they are used to meet temporary difficulties and then restored" 2, the existence of a very rigid formula which is binding, imposes adverse effects on countries in balance of payments need. This fact was acknowledged by the Executive Directors in their review of the rules for reconstitution in 1972 but the old formula still continued to apply. Moreover, the Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement, presently awaiting ratification, does not resolve the problem either, but simply stipulates that modification or abrogation of the rules for reconstitution can be brought about with a qualified majority 3
Rules for ReconstituUon
Under the rule for reconstitution, a participant is allowed to use all of its SDRs without maintaining a permanent minimum balance but will not be allowed to make use of the full amount permanently 4. A participant's net use of its SDRs must be such "that the average of its daily holdings over a five year period will not be less than 30 % of the average of its daily net cumulative allocation of SDRs over the same period" ~. As a result, if a country has reduced its holdings of SDRs below 30 % of net cumulative allocation, it is not sufficient to restore its holdings to 30% of its allocation to meet the requirement. "To achieve the required average position it is necessary to bring holdings from below 30 ~/0 to above 30 % 
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of the cumulative allocation and to keep them above that level long enough to make the product of time and amount in excess of 30 ~/o at least equal to the product of time and amount below that level" 6 Thus, in principle, a country during the first basic period could have used all its SDRs for the period under consideration and replenished its account at the end of the fifth year to reflect the required average. However, if there is little time, i. e. if the reconstitution begins only late or even at the end of the five year period, the amount necessary to achieve the required position may be far above 30% of the cumulative allocation, it may well assume an almost astronomical figure.
Therefore, to ascertain that reconstitution requirements remain manageable and give participants adequate warning about problems they may encounter with regard to reconstitution, the Fund has been making calculations for each participant since December 31,1971. When the point is reached where it must be considered as unlikely that a country will be able to meet its obligations under the reconstitution provision if it does not start reconstituting some of its holdings and refrain from further use of SDRs in its transactions, the IMF, based on provisions under Schedule G of its Articles of Agreement, will inform the member accordingly and apply graduated pressures in case of non-conformance. Assessment of the critical point is based on the magnitude of the quarterly reconstitutions necessary over a certain period to replenish holdings in order to meet the required average holdings of SDRs at the end of the five year period. In accordance with these provisions, the Fund:
[] simply indicates the need to reconstitute a specific amount which could be acquired voluntarily from another participant in transaction by agreement under Article XXV, Section 2 (b) (ii) or from the General Account if the quarterly amount calculated has not yet reached the level equivalent to 10 % of net cumulative allocation of SDRs;
[] actually designates a participant to reconstitute some of its SDR holdings "if the calculation shows that a participant would need to obtain SDRs for any reconstitution period.., in an amount per quarter that equals or exceeds 10% of the participant's net cumulative allocation at the end of the period" 7;
[] serves a country with a special notice that it is unlikely to be able to comply with the reconstitution requirements, if it still continues to use SDRs to the extent that the quarterly amount re- quired to meet the obligation is equal or in excess of 50% of net cumulative allocation.
If the member fails to satisfy the reconstitution provision the Fund can impose sanctions provided for by Article XXlX, Section 2 (b).
Zambia's Use of SDRs and Reconstitution Obligations
Zambia's total allocation under the newly created Special Drawing Right scheme amounted to SDR 24.6 mn, received in amounts of SDR 8.4 mn in 1970 , SDR 8.1 mn in 1971 and SDR 8.1 mn in 1972 During the first basic five year period, the 30% holding requirement had to be satisfied at the end of the fifth year after the first allocation. The first allocation was made January 1, 1971; therefore the first relevant five year period ended December 31, 1974.
To conform with the rules for reconstitution, Zambia could have satisfied the 30 % requirement by any combination of holdings that would have equalled a total of SDR 29.6 mn x 365 days. If the country would have made immediate and full use of the allocation, to which it was entitled, and had delayed adjustment to the last day of the basic five year period, the amount necessary for reconstitution would have been an absurd figure of SDR 10.8 bn. Even if reconstitution had started during the last year, the amount required would still have amounted to SDR 29.6 mn or 120% of the total allocation to the country.
In actual fact, Zambia held SDRs in excess of allocation for the first two years of the basic five year period o (Table 2) but depleted its holdings completely at the beginning of 1972 to finance adverse balance of payments developments. It did not replenish its holdings until it was designated to do so in 1974. This reconstitution was fairly massive as Zambia had to accumulate holdings equivalent to almost 50% of its total allocation. Yet, this reconstitution coincided with a period of
